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 Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress
 of Biomedicine
 Allowing universities to patent the results of government-sponsored
 research sometimes works against the public interest
 Arti . Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg
 Arti . Rai earned her under
 graduate degree from Harvard
 University in 1987. She stud
 ied medicine for one year at
 Harvard Medical School and
 then entered Harvard Law
 School, graduating in 1991.
 She served on the faculty of the
 University of San Diego School
 of Law before moving to the
 University of Pennsylvania
 Law School in 2000. Rebecca S.
 Eisenberg is a graduate of
 Stanford University and Boalt
 Hall School of Law at the Uni
 versity of California, Berkeley.
 She worked as a litigator in
 San Francisco before joining
 the University of Michigan
 Law School in 1984, where she
 is Robert & Barbara Luciano
 Professor. Both Rai and Eisen
 berg teach courses on intellec
 tual property law and the legal
 regulation of science. This arti
 cle is derived from scholarly
 work of theirs soon to appear in
 the journal Law and Contem
 porary Problems, published
 by Duke University School of
 Law. Address for Rai: Universi
 ty of Pennsylvania Law School,
 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadel
 phia, PA 19104. Internet:
 akrai@law.upenn .edu
 Although the development of pharmaceuti cal compounds has long been a commercial
 enterprise, the broader field of biomedicai re
 search has enjoyed a very different tradition,
 one that allows the free sharing of scientific
 knowledge. But the culture of open science has
 eroded considerably over the past quarter
 century. Proprietary claims have increasingly
 moved upstream, from the end products them
 selves to the ground-breaking discoveries that
 made them possible in the first place. One im
 portant reason for this change has been a nar
 rowing of the gap between fundamental re
 search and commercial applications. Once
 largely a matter of serendipity or trial and error,
 drug discovery now depends critically on basic
 knowledge of genes, proteins and associated
 biochemical pathways. In addition, the practical
 payoffs of basic research have become easy to
 anticipate in many cases, making it straightfor
 ward to obtain patents for discoveries that in an
 earlier era would have seemed too far removed
 from useful application to warrant the effort.
 This shift in patenting activity has met little
 resistance. For example, in 1980 the U.S.
 Supreme Court held that genetically engi
 neered microorganisms were eligible for patent
 protection. Shortly thereafter, Congress created
 a specialized court to hear appeals in patent
 matters, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
 Circuit, which has further extended the
 Supreme Court's expansive approach to patent
 eligibility. The Federal Circuit has also relaxed
 the standards normally required for patent
 protection, such as proof of the practical utility
 of an invention and of its lack of obviousness?
 standards that might otherwise have prevent
 ed the patenting of incremental advances in
 biomedicai research.
 These changes in the economics of research
 and in the interpretation of the patent laws
 have been important factors in the proliferation
 of intellectual property claims for discoveries
 of a fundamental nature. But perhaps even
 more significant has been the explicit U.S. poli
 cy of allowing grantees to seek patent rights for
 the results of government-sponsored research.
 This policy, which began in 1980 with passage
 of the Bayh-Dole Act, has turned universities
 into major players in the biotech business.
 The Bayh-Dole Act was intended to pro
 mote the widespread use of federally funded
 inventions. The sponsors of the legislation be
 lieved that permitting grantees to obtain
 patent rights and to convey exclusive licenses
 for their inventions to private corporations
 would motivate investors to pick up where
 the government left off. This process, it was
 hoped, would produce commercial products
 from discoveries that might otherwise lan
 guish in the halls of academe.
 This goal is, of course, quite noble. But the
 law draws no distinction between inventions
 that lead directly to commercial products and
 fundamental advances that enable further sci
 entific studies. Universities have taken the op
 portunity to file patent applications on discov
 eries like new DNA sequences, protein
 structures and disease pathways?results that
 are primarily valuable because they enable
 more investigation. Columbia University, for
 example, now holds a portfolio in which 50
 percent of its licensed patents represent such
 research tools. And even when they do not
 seek patents, universities often try to preserve
 their expectations for profitable payoffs by im
 posing restrictions on the dissemination of ma
 terials and reagents that might generate com
 mercial value somewhere down the line.
 This frenzy of proprietary claiming has coin
 cided with unprecedented levels of both public
 and private investment in biopharmaceutical
 research and development?and magnificent
 progress in health care. So for many people, it
 may be difficult to see that there is any prob
 lem. But in the long run the current system
 may, paradoxically, hinder rather than acceler
 ate biomedicai research. Here we explore how
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 Figure 1. Today certain drugs are routinely manufactured using genetically engineered bacteria, which are grown in reactors such as this one.
 Some attribute the widespread use of recombinant bacteria, and the rapid rise of the biotechnology industry in general, to the cheap, nonex
 clusive licensing of the underlying patent for shuffling genes into bacteria, which Stanley Cohen (then of Stanford University) and Herbert Boy
 er (then of the University of California, San Francisco) were granted in 1980. But few people have asked whether the results of this publicly
 funded research should have been patented in the first place rather than made freely available. The authors, both law professors, explore this
 question and suggest ways to manage the increasingly broad proprietary claims of government-supported research institutions. (Photograph
 courtesy of BioReliance Corporation.)
 the current system emerged and what could
 be done to fix some of its problems.
 Gold in Them There Halls
 In 1979, U.S. universities were granted only
 264 patents. But the statistics changed quickly
 after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act the fol
 lowing year. In 1997, for instance, U.S. univer
 sities received 2,436 patents, a nearly 10-fold
 increase in 17 years. This rise was significantly
 greater than the twofold increase in the overall
 rate of patenting during the same time period
 and also exceeded growth in university re
 search spending. Biomedicai discoveries ac
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 Figure 2. Growth in university patent activity in the United States over the past few decades has been tremen
 dous. Biomedicai patents account for an increasingly large fraction, now approaching 50 percent. (Data courtesy
 of Bhaven N. Sampat, Georgia Institute of Technology.)
 count for a large share of these patents, partic
 ularly in terms of licensing revenues.
 The majority of this patented research was
 publicly funded. (Despite the increasingly inti
 mate involvement of industry with universi
 ties, private companies actually fund only a
 small percentage of university-based research
 in the life sciences.) A prominent recent exam
 ple involves embryonic stem cells. In the 1990s,
 the National Institutes of Health (NIH) spon
 sored research at the University of Wisconsin
 that succeeded in deriving such cells from
 rhesus monkeys and macaques. The NIH
 sponsored research on primates yielded a
 broad patent for the Wisconsin Alumni Re
 search Foundation, the technology-transfer
 arm of the University of Wisconsin, which is
 sued an exclusive license to Geron Corpora
 tion. This patent covers all lines of embryonic
 stem cells for primates, including humans (al
 though for complicated reasons, Geron now
 holds rights to just three types of differentiated
 human embryonic stem cells).
 Figure 3. The Wright brothers did not license their wing-warping technique (shown in
 this drawing from the Wrights' 1906 patent) to the other major American aircraft maker
 of the time, the Curtiss Aeroplane Company, until compelled to do so by the govern
 ment at the outbreak of World War I. This history aptly illustrates how proprietary
 claims can thwart the development of an emerging technology.
 Clearly, NIH has a strong interest in ensur
 ing the widespread dissemination of such
 broadly enabling research tools. But the Bayh
 Dole Act significantly restricts what NIH can
 do. As long as the*.contractor is based in the
 United States, funding agencies may restrict
 patenting only in "exceptional circumstances,"
 when they determine that withholding title to
 the invention will better promote the goals of
 the Act. The Bayh-Dole legislation also pro
 vides administrative procedures under which
 a grantee can challenge the determination of
 exceptional circumstances, with a right of ap
 peal to the U.S. Claims Court. In addition, the
 agency must notify the Commerce Depart
 ment, which has primary responsibility for ad
 ministering this law, each time it claims excep
 tional circumstances, and it must provide an
 analysis justifying the action. If the Secretary of
 Commerce decides that "any individual deter
 mination or pattern of determinations is con
 trary to the policies and objectives of [the
 Bayh-Dole Act]," he or she must advise the
 head of the agency and the Administrator of
 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and
 recommend corrective actions. Given these
 cumbersome procedures, it is perhaps not sur
 prising that NIH declarations of exceptional
 circumstances have been extremely rare. In
 deed, we are aware of only a single case.
 The Bayh-Dole Act also permits an agency
 to compel licensing of the patents that result
 from research it had previously funded. But an
 agency can do so only if it determines that the
 university (or its exclusive licensee) is not tak
 ing steps to achieve "practical application of
 the subject invention" or if such licensing is
 necessary "to alleviate public health or safety
 needs or requirements for public use specified
 by Federal regulations." Exercise of such rights
 is not subject to an overarching directive that
 the circumstances be "exceptional." None
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 theless, the Bayh-Dole Act seriously restricts
 the value of this provision by deferring such
 actions pending elaborate administrative pro
 ceedings and exhaustion of court appeals. The
 administrative obstacles have proved suffi
 ciently high that NIH has never once exercised
 this option.
 Out of Reach
 Although the idea of private universities earn
 ing large sums of money from publicly spon
 sored research may be troubling enough for
 many the real problem with the Bayh-Dole Act
 is that it often puts such academic research ad
 vances out of the reach. Although one might
 imagine that patent holders don't enforce their
 patents for noncommercial uses, some have in
 fact been quite aggressive in this regard, insist
 ing that university investigators sign license
 agreements, especially when they seek to
 transfer materials covered by a patent rather
 than simply practicing a patented technique
 inconspicuously in their own labs. Given that
 patent law offers no significant exemption
 from liability for experimental use and that the
 division between noncommercial and com
 mercial research can be blurry, it is indeed fool
 hardy for academic scientists to rely on the for
 bearance of patent holders.
 Thus some patents can stall scientific
 progress. This concern is particularly acute for
 claims to early-stage discoveries that open up
 entirely new fields. Such patents may be quite
 broad, permitting their owners to control a
 wide range of subsequent research. One reply
 to this argument is that profit-seeking owners
 of pioneering patents will find it in their own
 best interest to disseminate their discoveries to
 as many follow-on improvers as possible. His
 tory shows otherwise. The Wright brothers, for
 example, refused to offer reasonable licensing
 terms for some of their aeronautical innova
 tions until compelled to do so by the govern
 ment. One notable recent example in the
 pharmaceutical industry is the controversy
 generated when DuPont imposed restrictions
 on academic investigators wishing to use its
 "oncomouse" technology, which DuPont con
 trols under an exclusive license from Harvard
 University, the patentee.
 Why would a company not want to license
 its technology as widely as possible? Isn't that
 how it makes money? One reason is that issu
 ing such licenses requires considerable time
 and effort. Given the imperfect information
 available to the parties involved, the disparate
 assessments of value to the technology and the
 danger that one side might misappropriate the
 research plans of the other once they are dis
 closed in the course of negotiations, the trans
 action costs associated with such bargaining
 are likely to be quite high. And these costs
 mount quickly when the basic research discov
 eries necessary for subsequent work are owned
 not by just one company, but by a number of
 different entities.
 Concern about an "anticommons" or "prop
 erty rights thicket" is quite pressing in contem
 porary biomedicai research, which often draws
 from many prior discoveries made by different
 scientists in universities and private compa
 nies. Exchanges of DNA sequences, laboratory
 animals, reagents and data that were once
 shared freely are today subject to licenses, ma
 terial-transfer and database-access agreements.
 These arrangements have to be reviewed and
 negotiated before research may proceed.
 A standard response to these fears is that
 market forces will motivate the emergence of
 patent pools and other institutions for bundling
 intellectual property rights. But this prediction
 has not yet been borne out. Indeed, when rep
 resentatives of biopharmaceutical companies
 have seen the potential for an anticommons,
 they have reacted not by forming patent pools,
 but rather by strengthening the public domain.
 The case of single nucleotide polymor
 phisms, or SNPs, provides an interesting exam
 ple of this phenomenon. Collections of SNPs
 are found throughout the genome and are a
 useful resource for scientists searching for
 genes involved in specific diseases. These SNPs
 also promise to be useful in developing diag
 nostic and therapeutic products. In recent
 years, various biotechnology companies have
 identified and sought patents on large numbers
 of SNPs, provoking concern on the part of both
 NIH and the pharmaceutical industry about
 the potential for balkanization of intellectual
 property rights to this important resource. Para
 doxically, the pharmaceutical industry has en
 joyed more latitude than NIH to respond to this
 threat by placing SNPs in the public domain.
 Figure 4. Controversy surrounds the so-called "oncomouse," an animal that has been
 genetically engineered to be prone to cancer. The technology, patented by investiga
 tors at Harvard Medical School, is licensed to DuPont, which demands that all those
 using such animals?even academic investigators?sign license agreements. (Photo
 graph courtesy of Harvard Medical School.)
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 Figure 5. Single-nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs, are variations in genetic se
 quence found at an appreciable frequency (greater than 1 percent) in different indi
 viduals of the same species. This mapping shows the known distribution of SNPs on
 human chromosome 1, with the names of some indicated at the right. The variation in
 the DNA base sequence that constitutes SNP WIAF-2068 is shown at top, with G, C, A
 and representing, respectively, the bases guanine, cytosine, adenine and thymine.
 Biologists anticipate that an understanding of the genetic diversity now being quan
 tified in this way will have various biomedicai uses?for example, in determining an
 individual's susceptibility to certain heritable diseases. Both the National Institutes of
 Health and a consortium of private companies have been pushing to keep SNP data in
 the public domain, for fear that too many proprietary claims on this information will
 impede its use in medicine. (Data from the Whitehead Institute/MIT Center for
 Genome Research.)
 Pharmaceutical companies have joined togeth
 er with the nonprofit Wellcome Trust (a U.K.
 based nongovernmental partner in the Human
 Genome Project, which is not bound by the
 Bayh-Dole Act) in a consortium to sponsor an
 SNP-identification effort with explicit instruc
 tions to put the information in the public do
 main. The SNP Consortium has candidly em
 braced a goal of defeating patent claims to
 SNPs. The willingness of private companies in
 a patent-sensitive industry to spend money to
 enhance the public domain is indeed curious.
 We think it is powerful evidence of a perception
 in industry that claims to intellectual property
 rights for fundamental discoveries can create
 significant barriers to subsequent research and
 product development.
 Possible Fixes
 One solution might involve changing the
 patent laws to restrict patents on fundamental
 research. Congress or the courts might, for ex
 ample, reinvigorate the "products of nature"
 limitation on patent eligibility so as to exclude
 discoveries of DNA sequences, proteins and
 biochemical mech?nisms from patent protec
 tion. Lawmakers and judges could also fortify
 the utility standard to limit the patenting of re
 search tools. Another much-discussed idea is
 to provide an exemption from infringement li
 ability for research, particularly noncommer
 cial research. Although such legal adjustments
 are worth considering, it is difficult to calibrate
 these changes accurately, and the consequences
 of overdoing it could be grave.
 Patents clearly matter to the biopharmaceuti
 cal industry, and undue restrictions on them
 may indeed deter private investment. Although
 it is possible that these companies?particularly
 those that make end products?would benefit
 in the long term from limits on certain patents,
 many of these businesses continue to insist that
 they need patents on their research to raise
 capital. Given that private investment in bio
 medical research and development today ex
 ceeds public funding, the strong belief of in
 vestors that patents are essential urges caution
 in changing the underlying legal rules.
 When research is publicly sponsored, how
 ever, the argument for strong patent rights los
 es much of its force. The Bayh-Dole Act does
 not presume that patents are necessary to mo
 tivate grantees to perform research but rather
 that patents will promote subsequent utiliza
 tion and development of inventions. The rea
 soning that lurks behind this presumption is
 that patents and exclusive licenses are essential
 to attract the necessary private investment.
 Whatever the merits of this presumption for
 patents on final products such as new drugs, it
 makes little sense for patents on broadly en
 abling information and techniques that are
 ready for dissemination to scientists in both
 56 American Scientist, Volume 91
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 public and private institutions, advances that
 can be put to use in the laboratory right away,
 without any further investment.
 A classic example is the Cohen-Boyer
 method for combining DNA from different or
 ganisms. Many observers attribute the rapid
 progress of the biotechnology industry to the
 fact that this technology was made widely
 available rather than licensed exclusively to a
 single company. Although this pre-Bayh-Dole
 technology was, in fact, patented, it was offered
 nonexclusively and cheaply to encourage com
 panies to purchase licenses rather than to chal
 lenge the patents. These nonexclusive licenses
 generated some $300 million for the universi
 ties that owned the patents, but it is difficult to
 see how they did anything to enhance product
 profitability or otherwise motivate subsequent
 research and development. If anything, the
 patent royalties imposed a modest tax on prod
 uct development.
 A greater concern is that the Bayh-Dole Act
 does little to ensure that a university will li
 cense such patents nonexclusively. To the con
 trary, Congress was careful in the terms of the
 Bayh-Dole Act and subsequent legislation to
 give universities discretion to grant exclusive
 licenses, which may be more financially attrac
 tive than nonexclusive licensing. Exclusive li
 censes typically command higher royalties,
 and companies holding exclusive licenses are
 more willing to reimburse for patent costs and
 to provide additional grant funding to the in
 ventor. Indeed, the information available sug
 gests that the majority of university licenses to
 startups and small businesses are exclusive.
 But it is not clear that such exclusive licens
 es are necessary to achieve the aims of the
 Bayh-Dole Act. A recent case in which patent
 ing and subsequent exclusive licensing were
 not necessary for product development in
 volves federally funded research that identi
 fied the cell-signalling pathway for NF-kB
 (nuclear factor kappa B), which regulates
 genes that function during inflammation, cell
 proliferation and programmed cell death.
 This research (which scientists at Harvard, the
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
 Whitehead Institute for Biomedicai Research
 carried out in the 1980s) led to a broad patent
 claiming all drugs that work by inhibiting
 NF-Kb cell signaling. Because the NF- path
 way has been implicated in diseases ranging
 from cancer and osteoporosis to atherosclero
 sis and rheumatoid arthritis, the patent?
 which was issued just last year?may cover
 drug treatments for all of these diseases. In
 deed, these academic institutions, together
 with their exclusive licensee, Ariad Pharma
 ceuticals, are now suing Eli Lilly & Co., claim
 ing that Lilly's osteoporosis drug Evista and
 its sepsis drug Xigris work in a manner that
 infringes the NF- patent. Ariad has also
 Figure 6. Evista (an osteoporosis-prevention drug, left) and Xigris (administered to pa
 tients endangered by sepsis, right) were developed by Eli Lilly & Co. using basic
 knowledge of the NF- biochemical pathway, which was worked out by scientists at
 Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Whitehead Institute for
 Biomedicai Research. Those institutions patented this basic research result and li
 censed it exclusively to Ariad Pharmaceuticals, which is now suing Lilly for in
 fringement of its patent and also demanding royalties from some 50 other companies
 with drugs based on the NF- pathway. This episode demonstrates that companies
 are often eager to develop the results of academic biomedicai research without first
 obtaining exclusive rights to it. (Photographs courtesy of Eli Lilly & Co.)
 sent letters to some 50 other companies with
 products that work via the NF- pathway,
 demanding royalties on present or future
 product sales. Obviously, the companies that
 are now being asked to pay royalties did not
 need an exclusive license from Harvard, MIT
 and Whitehead to motivate them to pursue
 product development; the prospect of obtain
 ing patents on their own end products was
 sufficient. In this case, as in many others, pio
 neering patents issued to academic institu
 tions only thwart innovation.
 For many discoveries emerging from gov
 ernment-sponsored research, the benefits of
 patenting are low relative to its costs. But some
 discoveries, including some important research
 tools and enabling technologies generated in
 the course of publicly sponsored research, un
 doubtedly require substantial commercial in
 vestment to become reliably mass-produced
 for widespread distribution. For example, tech
 nologies and machines for DNA sequencing
 and analysis, initially developed in academic
 laboratories, required substantial follow-up in
 vestment by private companies to turn them
 into reliable and commercially available equip
 ment. Patents and exclusive licenses may be
 crucial to motivate this sort of investment.
 The policy challenge, then, is to devise a sys
 tem that distinguishes cases in which propri
 etary claims make sense from cases in which
 they do not. The complexity of biomedicai re
 search makes this a formidable task, and the
 public interest in getting these determinations
 right demands assigning this responsibility to
 the most qualified body. Ideally, decisions
 about the dividing line between the public do
 main and private property should be made by
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 Figure 7. Development of DNA sequencing machines into reliable commercial prod
 ucts required considerable private investment. Few companies would have pursued
 such development without patent protection.
 institutions that are in a position to appreciate
 the tensions between widespread access and
 preservation of commercial incentives without
 being unduly swayed by motivations that di
 verge from the overall public interest.
 Preserving the Commons
 So where should these decisions be made? On
 first examination, one might think that universi
 ties, which reap the rewards of the proprietary
 restrictions they impose on others but also pay
 the costs of restrictions that others impose on
 them, might be interested in maintaining at least
 some research in the public domain. The prob
 lem is that the costs to a university are largely
 borne by its scientists who cannot get prompt
 access to the proprietary technologies they seek,
 whereas the gains from licensing revenues are
 much more salient to its technology-transfer of
 ficers, who are charged with generating revenue.
 So corning to a consensus might be difficult.
 Even when universities recognize that the
 larger academic community might be better off
 if they shared their research tools more freely,
 they face a serious problem: ensuring collec
 tive action. So long as other institutions are
 staking out claims, no university is likely to ab
 stain from asserting its own rights. Appeal to
 the traditions of open science may not be suffi
 cient, especially given that the scientists who
 hold those values don't usually make decisions
 regarding assertions of proprietary rights.
 Left to their own devices, universities prob
 ably cannot mount the sustained community
 effort needed to preserve the research com
 mons. But, interestingly, on a number of occa
 sions NIH has been able to use sternly worded
 appeals to the norms of open science to con
 vince academic institutions to keep basic re
 search in the public domain. For example, in
 1996 leaders of the National Human Genome
 Research Institute (NHGRI), together with the
 Wellcome Trust and academic researchers at
 the major human genome mapping centers, re
 solved that "all human genomic DNA se
 quence information, generated by centers
 funded for large-scale human sequencing,
 should be freely available and in the public do
 main in order to encourage research and de
 velopment and to maximize its benefit to soci
 ety." The NHGRI followed up with a policy
 statement making "rapid release of data into
 public databases" a condition for grants for
 large-scale human genome sequencing. The
 NIH could not, however, go so far as to forbid
 its grantees from filing patent applications
 without relying on the cumbersome "excep
 tional circumstances" clause of the Bayh-Dole
 Act. Rather than take this step, NIH declared
 that, as a matter ?f doctrine and policy, raw
 human genomic DNA sequence information
 should not be considered patentable. The state
 ment also warned that NHGRI would moni
 tor whether grantees were patenting "large
 blocks of primary human genomic DNA se
 quence" and threatened to invoke the "excep
 tional circumstances" limitation in future
 grants. In the specific context of large-scale
 genome mapping, universities were willing to
 embrace this policy.
 Administrators at NIH undertook a similar
 strategy for SNPs. Before the SNP Consor
 tium stepped forward to place this informa
 tion in the public domain, NIH had decided
 to allocate public funds for SNP identifica
 tion. Once again, NIH refrained from invok
 ing the "exceptional circumstances" provi
 sion of the Bayh-Dole Act. Instead, in its
 request for applications for SNP-related
 grants, the agency stressed the importance of
 making information about SNPs readily
 available to the research community and
 asked grant applicants to specify their plans
 for sharing data, materials and software. The
 NIH also warned that it reserved the right to
 monitor their patenting activity.
 The efforts of NIH to constrain its grantees in
 pursuing intellectual property rights have not
 been limited to genome projects. A more gener
 al statement of "Principles and Guidelines for
 Sharing of Biomedicai Research Resources,"
 adopted by NIH in December 1999, also at
 tempts to guide NIH grantees regarding propri
 etary rights. These principles state that "the use
 of patents and exclusive licenses is not the only
 nor in some cases the most appropriate, means
 of implementing the [Bayh-Dole] Act. Where
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 the subject invention is useful primarily as a re
 search tool, inappropriate licensing practices are
 likely to thwart rather than promote utilization,
 commercialization, and public availability."
 What NIH has sought to achieve through
 these various statements is broadly consistent
 with the intent of the Bayh-Dole legislation "to
 promote the utilization of inventions arising
 from federally supported research or develop
 ment." Arguably, however, at least with respect
 to patentable inventions, NIH has acted out
 side the scope of its authority, leaving itself
 vulnerable to legal challenge.
 Sound Footing
 The time is ripe to fine-tune the Bayh-Dole Act
 to give funding agencies more latitude in guid
 ing the patenting and licensing activities of
 their grantees. We propose two modest re
 forms that would give these agencies, which
 have the proper combination of knowledge
 and incentives, somewhat greater discretion to
 determine when publicly funded discoveries
 should be put in the public domain.
 First, the circumstances in which an agency
 may prevent its contractor from retaining title
 to an invention should be liberalized. The cur
 rent language of the law creates a clear pre
 sumption that an agency should exercise this
 power very infrequently. That should be
 changed. Once the "exceptional circum
 stances" language is deleted, the law could be
 more freely applied to achieve the goal of pro
 moting widespread dissemination and use of
 research results. The process for review of "ex
 ceptional circumstance" determinations should
 be streamlined as well, with provisions for re
 search to proceed while examination of the de
 cision runs its course.
 Second, Congress should modify the require
 ment that a funding agency's authority to com
 pel licensing of university patents be held in
 abeyance until all court appeals are exhausted.
 By the same token, however, an agency should
 not be given authority to act without some pro
 vision for judicial review. Unlike a determina
 tion to restrict patenting, a subsequent exercise
 of the right to compel licensing disturbs settled
 expectations. If business planning is too readily
 upset, industry could become wary of invest
 ing in university-based technology.
 It might be argued that restoring greater au
 thority to agencies would return us to the un
 happy position that motivated Congress to
 pass the Bayh-Dole Act in the first place. This
 danger appears quite small. In the intervening
 23 years, NIH has embraced patenting and
 technology transfer in furtherance of its mis
 sion of improving public health. Moreover, our
 proposal to give agencies greater authority
 would not overturn the general presumption
 in favor of allowing government contractors to
 patent inventions. It would simply permit
 agencies to decide that patenting is not war
 ranted in particular cases, while streamlining
 procedures for making and reviewing these
 decisions. Giving greater discretion to agencies
 would also correct a dangerous oversimplifi
 cation of how best to achieve the important
 policies underlying the Bayh-Dole Act, by rec
 ognizing that patenting and exclusive licens
 ing are not always the best way to go.
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